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This report summarizes the most significant Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) devel-
opments in 2005 in the United States and in the following jurisdictions (in alphabetical
order): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdomm,
and Venezuela.
I. United States,
The year 2005 was another extremely strong year for M&A activity in the United States.
The first six months of 2005 had the highest level of announced M&A activity-both in
the United States and worldwide-since the second half of 2000. Announced U.S. M&A
volume in the first nine months of 2005 exceeded $785 billion, representing a 37 percent
increase over last year's nine-month figure. Marquee transactions of 2005 include the pend-
ing takeover of MBNA Corp. by Bank of America Corp. ($36 billion); Procter & Gamble
Co.'s completed acquisition of Gillette Co. ($55 billion); and SBC Communications Inc.'s
completed acquisition of AT&T Corp. ($15 billion). Some of the significant developments
seen in U.S. M&A activity are outlined below.
*This summary was compiled and coordinated by Lennaert Posch, Partner of Stibbe, New York office and
Marcelo Bombau, Partner of M.&M. Bomchil, Buenos Aires office. Mr. Posch is a Vice-Chair of the M&A
and Joint Venture Committee of the International Section of the American Bar Association. Individual con-
tributors will be referred to at the discussion of each relevant jurisdiction.
a. Contributed by Joshua Cammaker, Partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Mr. Cammaker is the
Co-Chair of the M&A and Joint Venture Committee of the International Section of the American Bar
Association.
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A. THE CATALYST INVESTORS
Hedge funds are playing an increasingly important role in today's M&A transactions,
sharpening their attacks on takeover defenses and what they see as failings in companies'
corporate governance structures. Increasingly, they have been adopting the corporate raider
strategies of years past, agitating in favor of, or even against, transactions, with mixed
results.'
B. PRIVATE EQUITY CONsORTIuM DEALS
2005 saw a continuing surge in private equity activity in the United States. The coffers of
private equity funds continue to swell. New funds are being formed with little trouble
raising capital. With so many private equity funds out chasing deals, consortium or club
deals are becoming ever more popular. These are transactions in which a group of private
equity firms join together (occasionally also teaming with strategic buyers) to undertake
acquisitions.2 Despite the difficulty in putting together and holding together a consortium,
these deals are becoming a common structuring strategy, allowing private equity firms to
play a role in deals of all sizes and to allocate risk in a way that is conducive to successful
completion of a transaction.
C. STOCK ExCHANGEs THEMSELVES ENGAGE IN M&A
The year 2005 also witnessed trading exchanges becoming a focus of M&A activity. In
April, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) signed an agreement to merge with Archi-
pelago Holdings, Inc., a public company with an all-electronic stock market and a trading
platform. In the transaction, which is currently pending shareholder approval, the NYSE
will become a publicly traded company and will keep its regulatory arm separate as a not-
for-profit entity. Only two days after the NYSE signed its agreement with Archipelago,
NASDAQ teamed up with private equity firm Silver Lake to acquire the trading platform
company Instinet Group, Inc. for $1.88 billion. These transactions continued into the fall,
with private equity firm General Atlantic agreeing to invest $135 million in the New York
Mercantile Exchange for a 10 percent interest in the exchange. The Chicago Board of
Trade took a different route, going public in October.
1. Examples are Carl Icahn's battle with Time Warner Inc., pushing to spin offTime Warner's cable business
entirely and not just the minority piece the company contemplates divesting (as well as substantially increasing
its contemplated share buyback); his role in the scuttling of Mylan Laboratories Inc.'s proposed acquisition of
King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. earlier this year; Highfields Capital Management's relatively brief but unsuccessful
bid for Circuit City Stores, Inc.; Pershing Square Capital Management which agitated for Wendy's Interna-
tional, Inc. to spin off one of its chains, refranchise a significant number of its owned restaurants and use the
proceeds for share buybacks.
2. Recent examples include the $8 billion buyout of Toys 'R Us, Inc. by Bain Capital Partners and Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts & Co. teaming up with Vornado Realty LP; the $15 billion buyout of The Hertz Corporation,
the rental car company, by a group comprised of Clayton Dubilier & Rice, Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity
and The Carlyle Group; and the $12 billion SunGard Data Systems Inc. takeover by a consortium of Goldman
Sachs, Silver Lake Partners, Bain, The Blackstone Group, KKR, Providence Equity Partners and Texas Pacific
Group.
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D. DIRECTORS' ROLES AND DUTIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS
Delaware courts gave some much desired comfort and assurances to directors in 2005
regarding their discharge of duties, including in the context of takeover transactions. Sig-
nificant concern followed the Delaware Supreme Court's 2003 Omnicare decision3 regard-
ing the extent to which deal protection mechanisms, such as lock-up agreements with sig-
nificant shareholders to support the transaction and the absence of a so-called fiduciary out
provision, would be upheld as permissible, particularly where the target is controlled by
the shareholder signing the lock-up agreement.
InJune 2005, the Delaware Chancery Court, in its Toys 'R Us4 opinion, strongly supported
the principle that well-advised boards of directors have wide latitude in structuring a sale
process. The case gave important guidance on a host of deal-related issues, including deal
protection. A few months prior to the Toys 'R Us decision, the Delaware Chancery Court
dismissed a shareholder claim alleging that JPMorganChase unnecessarily paid a premium
in stock for its acquisition of Bank One, based on media reports that a no-premium deal
had been possible.' The decision centered on whether the claim was derivative in nature
(found not to be derivative) and whether the majority of the board was independent (found
to be the case). The court did not find anything in the record of the negotiations that made
the board's exercise of its business judgment in approving the deal suspect. This case pro-
vided comfort that the Delaware courts will not allow shareholder plaintiffs to rely on press
and media speculation in raising spurious claims in the context of a transaction. Finally, in
August, the Delaware Chancery Court, in the context of an executive compensation matter,
reaffirmed that the bedrock principle of the business judgment rule is alive and well. The
Disney decision6 alleviated concerns that the new Sarbanes-Oxley environment would di-
minish the protections afforded by the business judgment rule and create new bases for
director liability, particularly personal liability.'
These Delaware cases, coupled with the developments mentioned above, helped to propel
the volume of M&A transactions in 2005. These forces-reaffirmation of the traditional
deference accorded to the role and judgment of boards in deals; the prominent role of the
catalyst investor; and the consortium deal-show no signs of waning. It can be expected
that 2006 will be another very active year for M&A in the United States.
II. Argentina
b
M&A in Argentina are still influenced by the crisis affecting the country from 2001
through 2002. Although there were not many relevant deals during 2005, those that closed
focused on a cherry picking strategy, where buyers carefully screened opportunities and
selected those representing clear advantages, with a trend in purchasing valuable assets
belonging to distressed companies at devaluated prices. Among the bigger deals closed
3. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
4. In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).
5. In reJ.P Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., CA No. 53 1-N (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (mem).
6. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
2005).
7. Id.
b. Contributed by Marcelo Eduardo Bombau, Partner of M.&M. Bomchil. Mr. Bombau is a Vice-Chair of
the M&A and Joint Venture Committee of the International Section of the American Bar Association.
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during 2005, we find the sale of cement company Loma Negra to the brazilian group
Camargo Correa for over US$1 billion, and the above US$2.2 billion purchase by Organ-
izaci6n Techint of the mexican steel company Hylsamex.
The Public Registry of Commerce of the City of Buenos Aires has passed several reso-
lutions increasing the requirements for a foreign company to become a shareholder of a
local company.8 These requirements imply that many companies, especially off-shore ones,
will find it more difficult to acquire shares or organize companies in Argentina. A decree
passed in 2005 establisheed that any transfer of funds from foreign entities to Argentina in
order to acquire financial assets of any kind (excluding, in general terms, direct foreign
investments) cannot be transferred outside Argentina during a term of 365 calendar days
from the transfer of funds into Argentina.9 The foreign entity transferring funds to Argen-
tina must constitute a 365 calendar-day, registered, non-transferable, interest-free deposit
equal to 30 percent of the funds transferred into Argentina.
IM. Australia-
The Australian M&A market remained buoyant in 2005, although down from 2004.
Significant transactions included the acquisition of WMC Resources Ltd. by BHP Billiton
Ltd.; the proposed acquisition of Patrick Corporation Ltd. by Toll Holdings Ltd.; the
acquisition of Southcorp Ltd. by Fosters Group, Ltd.; the acquisition of Hills Motorway
Group by Transurban Group; and the acquisition of Dyno Nobel ASA by a consortium of
investors led by Macquarie Bank Ltd.'
A. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The most significant regulatory issue to arise was a judicial challenge to a decision of the
Takeovers Panel in July-the first such challenge in the five years since the Panel was
reconstituted in 2000. Modeled on the U.K Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the Panel
is an administrative body that acts as the primary forum for resolving disputes about a
takeover bid until the bid period has ended." The Panel is empowered to make a declaration
of Unacceptable Circumstances 12 when circumstances in relation to the affairs of a company
are unacceptable because of the effect on the control of the target or the acquisition of a
substantial interest in the target or because there has been a breach of the takeover provi-
sions of the Corporations Act.
The judicial challenge arose in the context of a seminal decision by the Panel on the use
and disclosure of synthetic equity instruments in takeovers. The Panel made a declaration
of unacceptable circumstances in Re Austral Coal Ltd No. 211 due to the failure of Glencore
International AG promptly to disclose the fact that it held cash-settled equity swaps over
shares in the target company (Austral Coal) until such time as Glencore was compelled to
8. Resoluci6n General 7/2005, B.O. Aug. 26, 2005, [30.724] (Arg.).
9. Id.
c. Contributed by Zeke Solomon and Andrew Finch, Partners of Allens Arthur Robinson.
10. See THOMSON FINANCIAL, FIN. ADVISORS-MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REV. THIRD QUARTER 23 (2005),
available at http://banker.thomsonib.con/.
11. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) §§ 659AA-659C (Ausd.).
12. Id. § 657A.
13. Austral Coal Ltd. (2005) A.T.P. 11 (Austl.).
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disclose its physical holding. In determining that unacceptable circumstances existed (in the
form of a materially uninformed market for control), the Panel made no determination as
to the effect of the non-disclosure on control or the acquisition. The declaration was sub-
sequently upheld by a Review Panel that similarly made no determination on the effect of
non-disclosure.14
Although parties are prohibited from commencing court proceedings in respect of a
takeover bid during the bid period,"5 Glencore enlivened the jurisdiction of the High Court
of Australia under section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution 16 claiming, among other
things, that the powers exercised by the Panel were unconstitutional. The matter was re-
mitted to the Federal Court of Australia that found the powers to be valid, but that in failing
to determine the effect of non-disclosure on the market, both the Panel and the Review
Panel had made declarations based on jurisdictional error. The proceedings were remitted
back to the Panel for reconsideration.
The newly constituted Panel again found unacceptable circumstances and made conse-
quential orders against Glencore that promptly made yet another application for judicial
review to the Federal Court (which is outstanding as of the date of this article). The Austral
Coal proceedings are significant for two reasons. First, like the U.K. Panel on Takeovers
and Mergers, the Australian Takeovers Panel is extending the scope of takeovers regulation
to synthetic equity instruments, such as cash settled equity swaps. Second, the viability of
the Australian Takeovers Panel as a forum for expedited resolution of takeover disputes is
now in serious question, as reference to the courts for judicial review of Panel decisions
once more raises the prospect of protracted tactical litigation.
B. RIGHTS ISSUES
There has long been concern about the potential for rights (or entitlement) issues by
listed and large non-listed companies to be structured so as to effect a change of control in
a company without needing to comply with the control provisions of the Corporations Act.
Specifically, there has been concern that a rights issue may be structured so as to ensure
limited acceptances, increasing the voting power of those who do accept in the context of
a non-underwritten issue or the voting power of the underwriter in underwritten issues.
The Panel has issued draft guidance on the point, 7 indicating that it will consider each
rights issue on its merits to determine whether it gives rise to unacceptable circumstances,
rather than setting out a safe harbor for structuring a compliant rights issue. Some of the
factors that will be considered by the Panel include whether the company needs funds, the
steps taken by the board to avoid an unnecessary change of control, how the issue is priced,
whether the issue is renounceable, and whether adequate disclosure of the possible change
of control impact has been made to shareholders.
14. Austral Coal Ltd. (R) (2005) A.T.P. 16 (Austl.).
15. Corporations Act § 659B.
16. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) § 75(V). Section 75(V) gives the Court juris-
diction to review the actions of public officials.
17. Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note 17: Rights-Issues, available at httpJ/www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?
ContentID = 1019.
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V. Brazild
A. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
Rules for public-private partnerships (PPP) in Brazil came into effect in 2005, introduc-
ing a new way to approach the relationship between the government and the private sector.
These are supplementary to the existing public bidding and concession rules. The PPP 18 is
defined as a concession agreement and includes compensation by the public partner to the
private partner and sharing of risks between the parties, as well as solid public payment
guarantees, thus making it possible to attract new investments from the private sector. As
a result, it enables the government to transfer economically unsustainable essential infra-
structure projects to the private sector.
B. DECISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
On October 4, 2005, the Superior Court of Justice of Brazil unanimously upheld the de-
cision that authorized the sale of Banco Real S.A., a major Brazilian bank, to the Dutch
group ABN Amro. Minority shareholders that felt jeopardized by the sale made an attempt
to suspend the transaction. The shareholders questioned the controlling interest held by
the former controlling shareholder in relation to the possibility of conducting a transaction
of such nature and also challenged the spin-offs carried out by the former controlling
shareholder that resulted in divesting the previously consolidated assets.
C. NEW FOREIGN ExCHANGE RULES
In early 2005 a new regulation came into effect allowing more flexibility to deal with
foreign exchange transactions. It also eliminated certain burdensome restrictions on the
foreign exchange market. The general rule of the new regulation is that any person or entity
is allowed to buy and sell foreign currency or carry out an international transfer of Brazilian
currency without any limit of value, provided that the transaction is legal, in compliance
with tax regulations, and is based on economic grounds with its liabilities defined in the
proper transaction's documents.
V. Canada-
Certain Canadian legal developments during 2005 resulted in some noteworthy issues
that impact M&A activity in Canada and transactions involving Canadian companies.
A. HARMONIZATION OF PRIVATE PLACEMENT RULES
Canadian provincial securities regulators took a significant step towards the consolidation
and harmonization of the various prospectus and dealer registration exemptions that existed
d. Contributed by Marcelo Freitas Pereira, Partner of Castro, Barros, Sobral, Gomes.
18. Anna Cecilia Rostworowski da Costa, Public-Private Partnerships in Brazil, THE BOMCHIL GROUP (2005),
available at http://www.bomchilgroup.org/bramar05.html.
e. Contributed by Ken Ottenbreit, Partner, and Kruti Patel, Associate, of Stikeman Elliott, New York office.
Mr. Ottenbreit is the Co-Chair of the M&A and Joint Venture Committee of the International Section of the
American Bar Association.
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in their respective provinces by implementing National Instrument 45-106-Prospectus
and Registration Exemptions. 9 Of particular relevance in the M&A context is the trans-
action exemption for business combinations and reorganizations. Pursuant to this exemp-
tion, securities can be issued and traded on an exempt basis with respect to (1) an amal-
gamation, a merger, a reorganization, or an arrangement that is carried out under a statutory
procedure or approved by the security holders; or (2) a dissolution or winding up of the
issuer. Also relevant is the transaction exemption for certain asset acquisitions in which
shares are issued as consideration for the purchase of assets. In addition, trades in, or a
distribution of, the securities of private issuers are exempt provided that certain conditions
are satisfied.
B. ALBERTA UNLIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS
On May 17, 2005, the Province of Alberta amended its Business Corporations Act 0 to
make the statute more attractive from a corporate tax perspective and became the second
jurisdiction in Canada to allow for the incorporation of an unlimited liability corporation
(ULC).2' ULC's are often used in U.S.-Canadian cross-border M&A transactions due to
the tax advantage, including the ULC's hybrid treatment as a corporation for Canadian tax
purposes and as a tax flow-through vehicle for U.S. tax purposes, under the so-called U.S.
check the box regulations for international entity classification. This structure permits cer-
tain deductions for the ULC, including interest expenses, to be treated as having been
incurred by the U.S. parent. A ULC is used also for U.S. group foreign credit tax planning.
VI. Colombia f
The most important M&A related development in Colombia during 2005 was the
amendment of the legal framework of securities regulation. Major changes that may affect
the M&A regulatory environment include: (1) regulation-primary regulatory role was
given to the central government; (2) supervision-the creation of the Finance Superinten-
dence; (3) stock issues and reacquisition-the maximum acceptance period for subscribers
was extended from three months to one year, and the subscription price is to be determined
by a technical study applying recognized valuation methods;2 (4) corporate governance-
the presence of independent directors on the boards, the creation of board audit commit-
tees, and the establishment of financial information control and disclosure systems were
introduced; and (5) disclosure-shareholder agreements in listed companies must be dis-
closed immediately after its execution.
In addition, the Central Bank reviewed foreign exchange regulations and added some
provisions to facilitate acquisitions through tender offers. Banking accounts in Colombian
pesos for acquiring shares were provided and the Central Bank authorized non-residents
to hold banking accounts in Colombian pesos if they intend to participate in an acquisition
19. B.C. Regulations (Securities Act) SOR/2005-269 (Can.).
20. Alta. Regulations (Business Corporations Act) SOR/200-118.
21. Id. § 16.
f. Contributed by Sergio Michelsen, Partner, and Jaime Moya, Associate, of Brigard & Urrutia.
22. The same rule applies to the determination of the price in stock reacquisition by listed companies, and
the stock reacquisition process must ensure an equal treatment to all shareholders.
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of stock through the stock exchange or the securities market that qualifies as a foreign direct
investment (FDI). The government issued Decree 4474 of 2005 amending the foreign
investment regime so as to allow foreign investors to borrow funds from local financial
institutions and use the proceeds to invest in domestic companies through the stock ex-
change. The relevant investment will be treated as a foreign investment and therefore the
investor will have foreign exchange rights to take dividends and proceeds from the eventual
investment liquidation out of the country.
VII. Franceg
In addition to the ongoing legislative and regulatory developments regarding the imple-
mentation of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids that was adopted on April 21, 2004,23 the
passing of the Loi Breton, and the amendment to the Autorit6 des march6s financiers (AM) 24
General Regulation, 2 the French M &A market has witnessed noteworthy developments
in the area of hedge fund activity.
A. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Transposition of the Directive
On September 21, 2005, France introduced its Draft Law implementing the Directive.
Having received Senate approval,26 the Draft Law is scheduled to pass sometime before the
end of 2005 and to come into effect in the first half of 2006. Some of the salient features
of the Draft Law include:
(1) retaining the concept of an equitable price found in the Directive and defined as the
highest price paid for the same securities by the bidder (or persons acting in concert)
over a period of twelve months prior to the bid, with limited exception to this rule
to be defined by the AMF;
(2) transposing the Directive's requirement that any governing body of a target seeking
to implement frustrating action first obtain shareholder approval. Any delegation of
the power to take frustrating action by the shareholders to another corporate body
will be temporarily suspended and any decision to implement frustrating action taken
prior to the bid, but that has either not been implemented or has been partially
implemented at the time of the bid, must receive shareholder approval; 7
(3) transposing the Directive's reciprocity principle enabling a target not to adhere to
the above requirement when the company launching the takeover, either alone or in
concert, does not apply the above rules or rules equivalent or is controlled by entities
that do not apply these rules or their equivalent. In this event, however, any frus-
g. Contributed by Youssef Djehane, Partner of Gide Loyrette Nouel, Mergers and Acquisitions Department.
23. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 Oj. (L 142) 12 (EC).
24. The AMF is the the French stock exchange authority.
25. To be further amended with respect to the above mentioned new regulations.
26. Note that the Draft Law was to be discussed within the Azsemblie Nationale by December 2005.
27. It is worth noting that while the Draft Law allows for poison pills if so agreed by a shareholders'meeting,
there is a real question as to whether such a poison pill will be admissible if, as was the case with the Aventis
"Plavix warrant" defense, it runs counter to another principle of the French stock exchange regulations such
as the prior clearance of the offer price by the AMF.
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trating action must first have been authorized by the shareholders in the eighteen
months leading up to the action;
(4) transposing the Directive's suspension of any limitation of voting rights attached to
shares in a company's by-laws during the first general shareholders' meeting follow-
ing a takeover bid if the bidder, acting alone or in concert, has acquired a certain
percentage of the target's share capital, such percentage to be further established in
an AMF regulation;28
(5) failing to transpose the Directive's provision for a freeze of extraordinary rights (such
as multiple voting rights, appointment rights, and the restriction on the transfer of
securities) during a bid. Instead, the Draft Law leaves it up to the company to decide
whether to freeze such rights and allows a company having done so to opt out where
a bidder has not implemented such a freeze;
(6) maintaining, at its present level of 95 percent of share capital and voting rights, the
threshold at which a squeeze out becomes possible instead of the 90 percent level
that is more in line with other European member states such as England;
(7) including the Senate's Danone29 amendment, according to which any person or entity
reasonably suspected of launching a takeover may be obliged to declare its intentions
to the AMF3° following terms and conditions to be further established in its General
Regulation. The AMF will have to disclose this information to the public and deter-
mine the conditions according to which a bid may be rejected if the bidder has failed
to comply with its intentions not to launch a bid within a given period, also to be
determined in its General Regulation.
2. The Loi Breton
On July 26, 2005, France passed a law known as the Loi Breton,"' the three most relevant
features of which are:
(1) the extension of the concept of control to any company that is either a partner or a
shareholder of a company in which it has the power to nominate or remove a majority
of the governing body's members;
(2) the obligation of any person to declare the crossing or falling below the additional
thresholds of 15 percent, 25 percent, and 90 percent of capital or voting rights
32 
of
a company.3 The obligation is not incumbent on a person who is controlled by
another person that has made such a declaration. This obligation applies not only
28. This article is merely a reiteration of the well-established AMF doctrine whereby the by-laws of a
company should include a provision according to which they may be amended if the bidder crosses a prede-
termined (generally 2/3) threshold.
29. This amendment was a response to the rumored takeover bid during summer 2005 by Pepsico for
Danone.
30. This is the same as in the United Kingdom where any rumored takeover bidder must disclose its intention
to the Takeover Panel.
31. The law is named after the Minister of the Economy, Thierry Breton, who was also the former CEO
of France Telecom.
32. These thresholds are now the following: 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 50%, 66%, 90%, and 95%.
33. It being specified that a person holding a usufruct right in a share, a person temporarily holding shares
on behalf of someone else, and a depository or representative pursuant to a power of attorney-provided such
person may exercise the voting right attached to the share-will be deemed to be a shareholder.
SUMMER 2006
320 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to shares that are traded on a regulated market but to shares registered with an
intermediary;
(3) the obligation, in the case of a takeover of a target listed on a regulated market in
France, to make a firm takeover bid on all companies (i) in which the target holds a
third of the capital or voting rights (the shares of which are traded on a regulated
market) and (ii) which constitute an essential asset of the target.3 4
3. Amendment to the AMF General Regulation regarding conditionality in deals
There are very limited conditions under which a takeover bid may be launched in France.
Material adverse change clauses are not allowed. As far as antitrust regulations are con-
cerned, the AMF General Regulation provides that a bid can be made on the condition
that the transaction contemplated by the bid will be approved in Phase I by certain com-
petition authorities 5 (namely the EC, the competition authority of each EU Member State,
or the Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice in the United States). The
AMF General Regulation specifies that should the Phase I investigation period be extended,
the bid will lapse.
On April 15, 2005, the AMF modified its General Regulation to make it clear that mere
referral letters to the competent competition authorities are sufficient for filing validly and
conditioning a bid upon the approval of antitrust authorities. Official notification to the
competent competition authorities opening the Phase I investigation period may then be
made and delivered to the AMF at a later stage. This modification clarified the fact that a
bidder may file a bid and give notice to the competent competition authorities only after
it has obtained their assurance that they will grant clearance to the transaction before the
lapse of the Phase I investigation period.
B. IMPACT OF HEDGE FutDs ON FRENCH M&A ACTIVITY
As in North America and England, hedge funds are becoming very active on the French
M&A market where they are increasingly involved in arbitrage dealings. The effect of this
increased importance is that recently, they have begun to thwart takeovers.
One of the first examples in France of a failed takeover resulting from interference by a
hedge fund occurred in March 2005.36 Financi~re Addax held 39.8 percent of the capital
and 55.1 percent of the voting rights in Camaieu that it had acquired on January 31, 2005,
at a price of eighty-five euros a share. It filed a bid with the AMF on the remaining shares
on February 1, 2005 at the same price. The bid opened on February 23 and closed on
March 31, 2005. On March 18, 2005, Sandell Asset Management Europe Ltd, acting on
behalf of Caslerigg Investment Ltd, announced that it had crossed the 5 percent threshold
of capital and voting rights in Camaieu respectively on March 16 and March 17, 2005. On
April 1, Sandell announced that, as of March 30, 2005, it held 10.43 percent of the capital
34. This amendment is said to have initially been intended to protect Renault and Nissan from foreign
takeovers. Its application, however, has inspired much criticism as a result of the technical difficulties it presents
and possible conflicts with other stock market regulations.
35. Law No. 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la Rtpublique Frangaise (J.O.] [Official Gazette
of France], Aug. 2, 2003, p. 13220, art. 46, v(l)-(2) (Fr.).
36. Youssef Djehane, Current Developments in French M&A Activity, http://www.ibanet.org/images/down-
loads/Youssef%20Djehane%20-%20Paper.pdf.
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and 8.45 percent of the voting rights of Camaieu. The effect of Sandell's acquisition on the
market during the bid period was to maintain the listed price above the bid price of eighty-
five euros and left the bidder with 40.06 percent of the capital and 55.32 percent of the
voting rights of Camaieu at closing, thereby making it impossible for Financi~re Addax to
perform a squeeze out and to benefit from the tax integration regime (that allows the bidder
to offset its financial losses with the profits of the target).
VIII. Germanyh
The German M&A market was very active throughout 2005. It started with the closing
of BorgWarner's acquisition of a majority stake in automobile supplier Beru AG on January
3, 2005, followed by public offering to outside shareholders. It generated the biggest Eu-
ropean bank merger, with Italian Unicredito taking over German Hypovereinsbank with a
total deal value arriving at fifteen to sixteen billion euros. But the activity in the M&A
market was topped by the activity of the German legislature.
Although the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, announced in early summer that
he would seek elections in September 2005 (which indeed happened and ended up with
Schroder's replacement by Christian Democrat Angela Merkel-though in a grand coali-
tion with the Social Democrats), this did not stop the legislature from bringing about
numerous changes, including the introduction of the new European company Societas Eu-
ropea (SE):
A. EuRoPEAN COMPANY
As a starter for the new year, the German Act on the Introduction of the SE entered into
force on December 29, 2004.11 It was enacted against the background of European Regu-
lation No. 2157/2001,8 on the statute for a European company (SE-Regulation), as well
as EU Directive 2001/86,19 regarding the participation of employees. While the SE-
Regulation is directly applicable in all Member States, the EU Directive on employee par-
ticipation needed special implementation legislation. But given that the directly applicable
SE-Regulation did not sufficiently deal with all issues in need of statutory coverage, the
purpose of the new German law on the SE is twofold. It supplements the SE-Regulation
with respect to the general rules on the formation of an SE and its corporate governance
(such part of the new German law is commonly referred to as the SE-AG), while at the
same time it implements the rules on participation of employees (referred to as the SE-
BG). While some legal writers have predicted that the SE may not become a very popular
form of legal entity, practice may show the opposite.
As the first German Dax-30 company, insurer Allianz AG, decided to use the takeover
of an Italian insurance subsidiary and create an SE by way of merger of the Italian subsidiary
h. Contributed by Dr. Joachim Rosengarten, Partner Hengeler Mueller, Frankfurt am Main. Mr. Rosen-
garten is a Vice-Chair of the M&A and Joint Venture Committee of the International Section of the American
Bar Association.
37. Press Release, FORIS AG, Bonn, Foratis AG Begins Trading in "European Companies" (SE), available
at www.foratis.com/thema_-en/000128/europ-aktiengesell-ag-se.html.
38. Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
39. Council Directive 86/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22 (EC).
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into Allianz AG. It appears that this decision has caused many other companies to consider
reorganization of their legal status. It is reported by many legal advisors and bankers that
several SE-projects are in the pipeline, ranging from big companies to German Mittelstand
companies repositioning themselves in Europe. Such activity should not really come as a
surprise, given that a merger of two stock corporations from different European jurisdic-
tions into an SE on the basis of the SE-Regulation is currently the only way of implementing
a cross-border merger in the true sense under German law. Also, it is only possible in the
form of an SE for a German stock corporation to elect a one-tier board as its appropriate
form of corporate governance-the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) tradi-
tionally provides for a two-tier board consisting of a board of management and a supervisory
board. It will be interesting to see if and how a one-tier board may be combined with the
German form of co-determination (Mitbestimmung) of employees.
IX. Indiai
India's commitment to the World Trade Organization means that significant steps have
been taken and further steps planned towards dismantling commercial barriers in terms of
FDI.4 In addition, there has been a move to embrace higher standards of corporate gov-
ernance reflecting aversion among investors to accept opaque management practices and
the government's growing recognition that poor corporate governance will restrict its abil-
ity to do business on the world stage. Shifts in corporate attitude and mindset among family-
owned businesses have a great impact on businesses where organizations have increasingly
come to accept the need for transparency in their management and business dealings. 4'
Although it may be to early to say, all of these changes have in fact helped to put a solid
base in place for a soundly based and sustainable upturn in Indian M&A.
Next to Japan, India had the highest growth rate in M&A activities across the globe in
2005.42 The total numbers of M&A deals in the first half of 2005 were up 80 percent
compared with the global average of 5.40 percetn and the Asia-Pacific (excluding Japan)
average of 6.57 percent. According to M&A data available from Bloomberg, Japan topped
the table with a higher growth in deal count at 84.7 percent. In terms of volume, despite
the subcontinent lagging behind the global average, it was better off than the rest of Asia,
as M&A volumes were up 34.23 percent from 2004 at $5.974 billion.43
Among the important legal developments that affected M&A directly or indirectly in-
clude the following:44
i. Contributed by Kamal Sultanpuri and Naila Jung, Associates of Fox Mandal.
40. INDIA DERP'T OF INDUST. POLICY & PROMOTION, INVESTING IN INDIA, http://www.dipp.nic.in/manual/
manual_ 11_05.pdf (ast visited Feb. 18, 2006).
41. ERNST & YoUNG, DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA (2005), http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/India/
DBI_2005/$file/dbi_2005.pdf.
42. Indo British Partnership Network, M&A Market Expected to Remain Buoyant in Fiscal 2006, http://
www.ibpn.co.uk/PwC%201ndia%20M%20&%20A%20Mid%2OYear%20Update%202005.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2006); see also, PricewaterhouseCoopers, The M&A Market is Expected to Remain Buoyant, Albeit with
Increased Competition, AsIA-PAcIFIc M&A BULLETIN (2005) [hereinafter PricewaterhouseCoopers, M&A Mar-
ket], http://www.pwchk.com/webmedia/doc/1122530045232-m&abulletin-ap-jun2005-in.pdf.
43. Indo British Partnership, supra note 42; PricewaterhouseCoopers, M&A Market, supra note 42; see also
Kai Taraporevala & James Winterbotham, India Inc High on Mergers & Acquisitions, BUSINEsS LINs, INTERNET
EDITION (2005) http://www.blonnet.com/2005/08/12/stories/2005081200541 OO.htm.
44. Indo British Partnership, supra note 42, at 1.
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(1) As per changes in Foreign Exchange Management Authority, the permission of RBI/
Government of India is not required in respect of transfer of shares and convertible
debentures by a person resident in India to a person resident outside India and vise-
a-versa on fulfillment of certain conditions specified in said notification41
(2) The current Indian M&A landscape is a reflection of a sound approach of the leg-
islature to assimilate India into the global village. Investment by non-resident Indians
made in foreign exchange on a non-repatriable basis has been allowed to be made
fully repatriable, whereas investment made in Indian rupees through rupee accounts
continued to remain non-repatriable.-
(3) New proposals for foreign investment and technical collaboration would henceforth
be allowed under the automatic route, subject to sectoral policies, as per the liber-
alized guidelines. 41
(4) Enhancement of FDI ceilings in various sectors (e.g., telecom, terrestrial troadcasting
FM, etc.).48
(5) Proposals for opening up more sectors for investment such as retail are on the anvil4 9
X. Ireland
There has been a significant level of activity in the areas of M&A and joint ventures in
Ireland in 2005. Key reasons for this include low interest rates and a high level of market
confidence. Indeed, the first nine months of 2005 exceeded 2004 in total value terms. There
have been takeovers by Irish companies at home and in the United Kingdom, particularly
in the areas of property, telecoms, food, and the media.
A key deal that took place in 2005-and probably the one that attracted the most public
interest-was the takeover battle for the Jurys Doyle Hotels Group, which essentially was
an MBO that lasted six months. As part of the process, several key assets were spun off.
The Jurys Hotel, Ballsbridge site was sold to Sean Dunne, who paid €260 million for the
4.8 acre site and the Jurys Berkeley Court Hotel site went to a private consortium (including
members of the Doyle family) for El 14 million for the 2.2 acres.
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London is becoming increasingly popular
with a growing number of Irish companies listed in order to take advantage of lower costs
and less stringent regulations involved in raising capital in this manner.5 0 Thus, the Irish
Enterprise Exchange (IEX)5 l was introduced in April 2005, which provides a similar service
with largely the same rules, in order to encourage Irish companies to join IEX rather than
AIM in the future. Newcourt is an example of a large Irish company that is listed on both
exchanges.
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 33.
j. Contributed by Hazel Flynn, Associate of A&L Goodbody, Dublin.
50. LONDON STOCK ExcHANGE, AiM: THE MOST SUCCESSFUL GRowH MARKET IN THE WORLD (2006), http://
www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/3B5EDCF9-EO1 -4B7C-A3 IA-95B7170675B9/0/LSEAIM
BROCHUREWEB.pdf.
51. Irish Stock Exchange, Irish Enterprise Exchange, http://www.ise.ie/index.asp?doclD = 358 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006).
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There has also been a significant development from a legislative perspective, particularly
with the implementation of the Prospectus Directive,52 by way of the introduction of the
Prospectus (Directive 2003/71/EC) Regulations 2005" on July 1, 2005. These regulations
lay down principles in relation to the drawing up, approval, and distribution of prospectuses
when securities are offered to the public or admitted for trading on a regulated market.
The objective is to enhance investor protection through the production of high quality
prospectuses and to improve the efficiency of raising capital through the issue of a single
approved prospectus that will be valid for use across the EU.
x. Italy,
A. FAILURE TO LAUNCH A MANDATORY TENDER OFFER AND MONETARY DAMAGES
In a recent and controversial decision,54 the Milan Tribunal held SAI-Fondiaria and Me-
diobanca liable for damages for failure to launch a mandatory bid over the shares of La
Fondiaria, when the former companies had exceeded the relevant threshold for the purposes
of the mandatory bid (30 percent of voting stock)," through a concealed, concerted action
in 2001 that was finally ascertained by CONSOB (i.e., the Italian stock market regulator)
at the end of 2002. The importance of this decision stems from the fact that, for the first
time, an Italian court has awarded damages in favor of shareholders that were not given the
opportunity to tender their shares in a mandatory bid.
Administrative sanctions aside, Italian law provides for two express remedies for failure
to launch a mandatory bid: (1) the acquirer cannot vote any of its shares and (2) the acquirer
is compelled to sell the shares it holds above the 30 percent threshold.5 6 By requiring the
sale of the shares exceeding the 30 percent threshold, the law aims at reestablishing a
situation in which there is no dominant shareholder, and thus the target can still be theo-
retically subject to potential bids in the market for corporate control, though the acquirer
may nevertheless retain a 30 percent participation interest and still maintain a non-trivial
influence. The law says nothing, however, regarding whether investors may also have a
cause of action for damages vis-a-vis the person(s) or entity(ies) who failed to launch a
mandatory bid. While the majority of legal commentators argue that monetary damages
may be awarded pursuant to general principles of contract law (or tort law, depending on
the authors), according to other commentators and, most importantly, previous decisions
by Italian Courts (that actually applied an older legal regime), the law provides for no
remedies other than the express sanctions, and hence investors are not permitted to seek
further protection. The argument is that once the acquirer has fulfilled the duty to sell the
stake in excess of the permissible threshold, there is no justification for imposing damages,
as such a shareholder's influence should no longer be relevant and the target can be taken
over by other parties.
52. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 OJ. (L 345) 64 (EC).
53. Prospectus (Directive 2003/71/EC) Regulations 2005, (324/2005) (Ir.).
k. Contributed by Robero Casati, Partner, and Matteo Montanaro, Associate, of Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP Mr. Casati is a Vice-Chair of the M&A and Joint Venture Committee of the International
Section of the American Bar Association.
54. Tribunale di Milano, May 26, 2005. See, Societ, 2005, 1137; and Corriere del Merito, 2005, 1147.
55. Legislative Decree No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, art. 106, Gazz. Uff. No. 71 of Mar. 26, 1998.
56. Id. at art. 110.
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The Milan Tribunal held SAI-Fondiaria and Mediobanca liable on the theory that the
express sanctions provided for by the law do not prevent shareholders from obtaining mon-
etary damages in all those circumstances in which such sanctions would result in being
ineffective. In the specific case, the sale of the stake exceeding the 30 percent threshold
proved to be an ineffective remedy as it was made on a pro-rata basis only after the target
La Fondiaria had been merged into SAI, which in turn had a controlling shareholder and
thus could not be subject to unsolicited takeovers in the future. The amount of the damages
awarded by the Tribunal was equal to the difference between the hypothetical price at which
the mandatory bid should have been launched and the market price on the day following
the violation, multiplied by the number of shares held by the plaintiff on such a date.
XII. Japan'
In terms of M&A developments, the year 2005 was a momentous one for Japan, both
from a market and legal perspective. The M&A market continued to show record double-
digit growth in terms of the number of deals announced, and Japan's judiciary began enun-
ciating principles for ameliorating corporate takeover defenses, including poison pills,
which were employed in several sensational cases marking the long awaited emergence of
Japan's fledgling market for corporate control. A sweeping new Companies Law was passed
in June 2005, augmenting the ability of Japanese corporations to engage in cross-border
mergers, but also enhancing corporate boards' powers to fend off hostile takeovers. One
development that is sure to foster a higher level of cross-border investment in Japan is the
new Japan-U.S. income tax treaty 7 that became fully effective on January 1, 2005.
A. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The robust growth in Japan's M&A market during 2005 surpassed that of the world's
major M&A markets, including those of the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. For the year, a
record 2552 deals involving Japanese companies were announced, representing a 23 percent
increase over 2004's deal volume, and the fourth straight year of double-digit growth.
Moreover, total deal value for the year 2005 stood at $167.6 bilhon-a more than doubling
of the previous year's deal value. 5s A few mega-deals contributed to these records. For
example, on October 1, 2005, the world's largest bank by asset values was created when
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group formally acquired UFJ Holdings, Inc. for $41.4 billion.
The second largest all-Japanese deal in 2005 was department store giant ItoYokado's ab-
sorption of its subsidiary, Seven-Eleven Japan Co., for $12.5 billion.59 The large increase
1. Contributed by Pamela Ann Fuller, an American lawyer specializing in international taxation and cross-
border investments.
57. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, Treaty Doc. No. 108-14.
58. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Japan, ASIA-PACIFIC M&A BULLETIN (2005) available at http://www.
pwchk.com/webmedia/doc/1 139997477956_m&abulletin-ap-dec3005_jp.pdf.
59. Almost all of Japan's M&A activity in 2005 was comprised of domestic deals. In fact, the value of
transactions involving the acquisition of a Japanese entity by a foreign-based company dropped 55% from the
year 2004. See id. The drop may be due to the fact that in 2004 many foreign deals involved private equity
funds looking for falteringJapanese companies they could turn around. By 2005, there were fewer suchJapanese
companies available. See Andrew Morse, M&A Activity in Japan Surges to Record Level, WALL ST.J.,July 5,2005,
at C4.
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in M&A activity appears attributable to companies' efforts to streamline their operations
through strategic reorganizations, and not to mere disposals of distressed assets.
The hostile activity that occurred in Japan's M&A market in 2005 may seem unremark-
able by Western standards. But in Japan, the very fact that hostile takeovers were being
staged at all was earthshaking news since, until recently, such tactics were considered taboo
and practically impossible to execute as the control of postwar Japanese corporations had
long been ensconced in the hands of stable shareholders and affiliated banks loyal to in-
cumbent management. One of the most dramatic corporate takeovers in Japanese business
history was staged in 2005, when a young internet startup firm-Livedoor-gained a con-
trolling interest in Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS)-the largest shareholder of the
old-line media conglomerate, Fuji Television Network. Livedoor amassed its stake in NBS
by taking advantage of a loophole in Japan's Securities and Exchange Law that allowed it
to buy NBS shares electronically, after the trading floors had closed and without ever an-
nouncing a tender offer. When Livedoor announced that it held more than 30 percent of
NBS's voting power, NBS and Fuji launched a series of defensive measures, including a
plan by NBS to issue equity warrants to Fuji in order to dilute Livedoor's stake in NBS.
The Tokyo District Court upheld Livedoor's injunction, holding that NBS had failed to
show that irreparable damage would definitely result if Livedoor gained management con-
trol. The Livedoor-Fuji battle for control of NBS convinced lawmakers to close the loop-
hole in the SEL, and also prompted many Japanese corporations to institute potent takeover
defenses. The NBS takeover contest was settled in April 2005, when Livedoor agreed to
sell to Fuji the 50 percent stake it had by then acquired in NBS in exchange for Fuji's
agreement to buy a 12.75 percent stake in Livedoor for forty-four billion yen and to enter
into a business alliance with Livedoor.
But the envisioned synergistic alliance between Livedoor-the emblematic leader ofJa-
pan's new generation of flashy startup companies-and Fuji-an old-line, rather stodgy,
Japanese media conglomerate-was illusory. Not only was there a lot of bitter resentment
within Fuji's management ranks over Livedoor's unconventional business tactics, but in the
autumn of 2005, Japan's Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission began secretly
investigating Livedoor for suspected securities law violations, resulting in the arrests and
indictments of Livedoor's top executives in early 2006,60 a free fall in Livedoor's stock
price,61 the scheduled delisting of Livedoor from the Tokyo Stock Exchange on April 14,
2006,62 and the sale by Fuji of its 12.75 percent interest in Livedoor to another corpora-
60. The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors' Office is charging that Livedoor's former president, Takafumi
Horie, and several other top Livedoor executives, conspired to funnel proceeds of Livedoor's own group stock
sales through several off-balance-sheet investment partnerships and foreign bank accounts in order to illegally
inflate Livedoor's pre-tax income and the value of the affiliated group's stock. Prosecutors believe Livedoor
fraudulently reported a consolidated pretax profit of 5.03 billion yen in the year ended September 2004 by
booking fictitious sales, although it actually incurred a pretax loss of 312.78 million yen.
61. Livedoor lost nearly 90% of its trading value in the two months following the January indictments of
its executives. Meanwhile, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average tumbled 5.7% in just two days of the Livedoor sell-
off, prompting the TSE to suspend all trading on January 18, 2006-the first early close in the TSE's 57-year
history.
62. On March 13, 2006, the TSE announced it would delist the Livedoor and Livedoor Marketing stocks
after the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission filed a criminal complaint against Livedoor and
five of its former and current executives on charges of falsifying financial statements.
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tion.63 The spectacular rise and fall of Livedoor will not likely stifle the future growth of
Japan's promising M&A market. But it will undoubtedly leave a legacy. The seeming ease
with which Livedoor acquired NBS without the consent of the target's management has
already put lax Japanese corporate managers on their toes, and the securities scandal that
subsequently sent Livedoor's stock plummeting highlights the need for Japan to reform its
insular corporate governance system in which truly independent directors are now rarely
employed, and to revamp its financial accounting rules, especially with respect to the treat-
ment of off-balance-sheet special-purpose entities.
B. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
On June 29, 2005, Japan's Diet passed the 2005 Companies Law-4 that broadly amends
and integrates old business codes into one streamlined, principles-based statute. 6 The
Companies Law, most provisions of which take effect on May 1, 2006, repeals the oldytgen
kaisba form for closely held companies and replaces it with two modem business entities-
a limited liability company (LLC) and a limited liability partnership (LLP)-both of which
are patterned on American models. The new Companies Law also expands the categories
of permissible consideration in indirect cross-border mergers to include cash, bonds, and
shares of foreign corporations. This controversial amendment will make it easier for a
foreign company to acquire a Japanese target and to cash out any dissenting shareholders.
But amidst the widespread fears of a sudden surge in foreign takeovers of Japanese com-
panies, lawmakers deferred the effective date of this particular amendment to 2007-a move
that has been heavily criticized by foreign business interests as too protective.6
Another highly controversial provision in the new Companies Law is article 821, which
has the potential to substantially restrict the ability of foreign corporations to conduct
business in Japan through unincorporated branches. Although article 821 ostensibly applies
only to foreign entities seeking to evade Japanese business regulation through the use of
off-shore companies, critics argue the provision is drafted too broadly and will catch many
conventional off-shore structures with legitimate business purposes. Some foreign firms are
considering reorganizing their operations in Japan to avoid the potential application of
article 821 which, when it applies, could pierce the foreign corporate veil and impose per-
sonal liability on individuals.
63. On March 16, 2006, Fuji sold its entire 12.75% stake in Livedoor to the president of Usen Corporation-
a major cable broadcaster with a reputation for buying and reviving distressed companies. For its 2005 fiscal
year, Fuji will claim a 34.5 billion yen loss on the sale, and has also announced that it plans to sue Livedoor
for damages.
64. Kaisha Ho [Companies Law], Law No. 86 of 2005.
65. The Companies Law also relaxes rules applicable to Japan's joint stock companies (kabushiki kaisha or
KKs). For example, the minimum initial capitalization requirements for new KKs is being reduced from the
current ten million yen to just one yen under the new law in order to encourage the incorporation of new
businesses. See id.
66. Lawmakers apparently likened a negotiated triangular merger to an unsolicited takeover bid, which is
an unfounded analogy. A triangular merger is an extraordinary transaction underJapanese law, requiring a two-
thirds majority vote of the merging company's shareholders. While it is theoretically possible to get this level
of approval without management's consent, it is highly unlikely, even in a U.S. corporation, much less in a
Japanese one. Even when the foreign triangular merger transaction becomes legally available in 2007, it is not
likely to be utilized unless it is also made tax free to the Japanese target's shareholders.
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When the new Companies Law becomes effective in 2006, Japanese firms will have more
choices in crafting defenses against hostile takeovers, including golden shares with special
veto rights. Many of these newly sanctioned takeover defenses have a distinctly poison pill
character, in that they can effectively dilute the voting power of an unwanted suitor if
activated. In November 2005, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry and the Min-
istry of Justice jointly issued final Takeover Guidelines6 7 that appear to incorporate, to a
high degree, twenty years of American takeover jurisprudence as they set forth a fair and
reasonable standard for takeover defenses, with the ultimate test of reasonableness being
whether the defenses enhance corporate value. Although not legally binding, the ministry-
sponsored Takeover Guidelines clearly influenced the Tokyo District Court in upholding
Livedoor's temporary injunction against NBS, and are widely expected to play an influential
role in shaping Japan's regulation of hostile takeovers in the future.
XIII. Mexicom
The most relevant M&A authorized in 2005 by the Federal Competition Commission
(FCC) are transactions involving General Electric Co.; Accor, S.A.; Club M~diterrane6,
S.A.; Oracle Corporation; Grupo Sanborns, S.A. de C.V; CEMEX Concretos, S.A. de C.V.;
Femsa Cerveza, S.A. de C.V.; Bayer Healthcare AG/F Hoffinann-La Roche AG;JP Capital
Corp.; Grupo Comercial Chedraui, S.A. de C.V/Grupo Carrefour, S.A. de C.V; Goldcorp,
Inc.; Wheaton River Minerals, Ltd.; JP Morgan Chase & Co.; Radiomovil Dipsa, S.A. de
C.V; Minas de San Luis, S.A. de C.V.; Sprint Corp.; Nordic Capital VLP.; The Procter &
Gamble Co./Gillette Co.; and Grupo Bimbo, S.A. de C.V, among others.
The FCC also cleared the acquisition of the capital stock of a publicly held steel company
named Hylsamex, S.A. de C.V, a company with significant participation in the steel industry
in Mexico and Latin America. In turn, Industrial Investments Inc. and Siderar SAIC ac-
quired Hylsamex for a total of approximately US$2.095 billion, probably the largest trans-
action in Mexico this year.
Another interesting concentration, after a long road of financial burdens faced by the
government owned companies, finalized this year with the sale of Mexicana through a public
auction. CINTRA, owner of virtually all capital stock of two major airlines in Mexico,
namely Mexicana and Aeromexico, notified the FCC to clear the sale by public auction of
those two groups. The FCC cleared the sale in two blocks, namely Aeromexico and a
subsidiary as the first block and Mexicana and a subsidiary as second block. The only at-
tractive tender offer was made by Grupo Posadas, S.A. de CV., who in turn adjudicated
Mexicana at US$165.5 million, which included net liabilities up to US$1.456 billion. On
the other hand, the sale of Aeromexico was set off for a future proceeding.
67. See Kigyo Kachi Kenkyu Kai [Corporate Value Study Group], Tekitaiteki Baishu Boei Saku (Kigyo Kachi
Boei Saku) no Seibi [Preparing Defensive Measures toward Hostile Takeovers (Measures to Defend Corporate
Value)], March 2005. An English summary of the preliminary report by the Study Group on its recommended
takeover guidelines is availabk at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/Corporate%20Value.
pdf.
m. Contributed by FranciscoJ. Velizquez-Osuna, Partner, Luis Uriel Pdrez-Delgado andJorge E. Fragoso-
Garavito, Associates of Goodrich, Riquelme & Asociados.




In the first half of 2005, the value of the M&A market in Poland equaled 843 million
euros, which is a 16 percent growth compared with the same period last year. Although the
number of such deals decreased significantly when compared with those for the same period
of 2004, the total value of these transactions grew (approx. US$1.4 million).
One of the most significant transactions involving Polish capital in 2005 was PKN OR-
LEN's acquisition of a 62.99 percent majority stake in UNIPETROL on May 24, 2005.
The purchase of Unipetrol shares is the biggest Polish foreign investment ever. The above
transaction is one example of Polish companies expanding their businesses abroad, main-
taining their position in new markets such as Romania or Ukraine, and trying to gain access
to these markets for their products.
In the first half of 2005, there were seventy transactions concluded, which is 30 percent
less than last year. Polish investors participated in thirty-seven of these transactions. The
apparent growth of Polish investment activity is the result of the continuing process of
consolidation. In the preceding year, foreign investors were more likely to invest in markets
in other countries in the region.
B. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
On October 24, 2005, the Law on the Public Trading of Securities6s was replaced by
three new acts: the Act on Public Offer and Conditions of Introducing Financial Instru-
ments into the Organized System of Turnover and on Public Companies, the Act on Turn-
over of Financial Instruments, and the Act on the Supervision of the Capital Market.69 All
of theses acts were created to comply with the EU Directive 2004/25/EC of April 21, 2004
on takeover bids that is to be adopted by Member States by May 2006.70
Under the new regulations, the notification duties of public company shareholders will
be extended to include legal events, other than acquisition and sale of shares, as a result of
which the threshold of votes at a general meeting is exceeded. According to the new acts,
the above notification is required when a 5 percent, 10 percent, 25 percent, 33 percent, 50
percent, and 75 percent threshold level of the general number of votes in a public company
is reached. Furthermore, the new regulations annul the duty of acquiring the Securities
Commission's permission to exceed the number of 25 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent
votes at a general meeting of a public company. Until October 24, 2005, such permission
was required if the general number of votes exceeded 25 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent.
To comply with the new regulations, a shareholder will need to notify the Commission
about such a fact.
n. Contributed by Dr. Torsten Bogen, Partner of Gleiss Lutz, Warsaw office.
68. Act Amending the Law on the Public Trading of Securities and Amending Other Acts, Journal of Laws
of 2004, No. 64 item 594 (Pol.).
69. Act on Public Offering, Conditions Governing the Introduction of Financial Instruments to Organised
Trading and Public Companies, Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 184 item 1539 (Pol.); Act on Trading in Financial
Instruments, Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 183 item 1538 (Pol.); Act on Capital Market Supervision,Journal
of Laws of 2005, No. 183 item 1537 (Pol.).
70. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 OJ. (L 142) 12 (EC).
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According to the new regulations, the majority shareholder who is the owner of at least
90 percent of voting rights, will have a squeeze-out right, enabling him to call on the
remaining shareholders to sell him their securities. It should be stressed at this point that
examination of the squeeze out right will not require the consent of the shareholder con-
cerned. The squeeze-out right is associated with a sell-out right that provides the minority
shareholders with right to require the majority shareholder to buy their securities.
XV. Russia-
A. SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTIONS AND MARKET TRENDS
The most significant transaction during 2005, and Russia's biggest ever takeover, was
Gazprom's acquisition of Millhouse Capital's (owned by Roman Abramovich and associates)
72.7 percent holding in Sibneft, Russia's fifth-biggest oil firm, for US$13.1 billion. The
deal demonstrates the government's intention to reassert control over the energy sector,
reversing the effects of some of the controversial privatizations of the 1990s. But the manner
in which Gazprom acquired Sibneft-by paying market price-may arguably serve to re-
assure investors worried by the Yukos affair and the way in which Rosneft gained control
of Yuganskneftegaz. 7'
The second largest deal of 2005 was the acquisition by 000 Ural Steel and Sitbon
Investment Limited of a 97.5 percent interest in Russia's second biggest iron ore producer,
Mikhailovsky, evidencing the continued strong performance of the steel sector. This strength
is further evidenced by Severstal's acquisition of a 62 percent stake in Italian steel-maker
Lucchini SpA for E430 million; perhaps the most significant deal for a Russian company
outside Russia during 2005.
Natural resources remain the core of the Russian economy and this sector will undoubt-
edly continue to be a focus for investors. Gazprom's acquisition of Sibneft, however, indi-
cates the increased sensitivity around investment in the natural resources sector and the
government's desire to exert control over this area. Accordingly, opportunities for major
outright acquisitions by foreign investors are likely to be limited in the future.
There has been much increased M&A activity in consumer sectors during 2005 driven
by the rapid growth in the gross domestic product, increased consumer spending power,
and the reduced political risk associated with these sectors.
B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
There were few developments of real significance to M&A/joint venture transactions in
Russia during 2005. One key change was the significant increase in the thresholds triggering
a requirement to notify, or obtain the consent of, the Federal Antimonopoly Service72 in
circumstances where a significant or controlling interest in a Russia entity is, directly or
indirectly, to be acquired. Prior consent is required in respect of an acquisition, where the
target and the acquirer group have combined assets of approximately US$110 million (in-
creased from US$ 700,000).
o. Contributed by Robin Wittering, Partner, Herbert Smith CIS LLP.
71. Cathrine Belton, Gazprom Scoops Up Sibneft for $13Bln, THE Moscow TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005.
72. See Federal Law No. 13-FZ, Rossiiskaia Gazeta [Ros. Gaz.] [Russian Newspaper] 2005, No. 48, p. 9.
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Another development of relevance is the reduction of the term during which a transaction
may be invalidated by any interested party or the courts because it conflicted with Russian
law from ten to three years following completion." This effectively validates, from a civil
law perspective, the privatizations of the 1990s, thereby reducing the need for due diligence
to focus upon identifying potential defects in the privatization process. This issue has been
a particular concern for foreign investors.
In the energy sector, the ongoing saga of the promulgation of a new subsoil law, which
may impose limitations on foreign ownership of, but a fairer process in the acquisition of,
subsoil licenses, continues74 with no immediate prospect of the Duma adopting such leg-
islation. The content of the law is subject to change, but the most recent draft suggested,
inter alia: (a) a shift from licenses to civil law agreements; (b) a smoother transition from
geological study to exploration and production; and (c) reduced administrative discretion
in relation to termination, limitation, and suspension of tights.
XVI. Spainp
Spain, through Law 19/2005, added a new chapter to the Spanish Public Limited Lia-
bility Company Law (Ley de Sociedades Andnimas),1" which is applicable to the European
public limited liability company (SE) with registered office in Spain, pursuant to the pro-
visions of European Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European
company (the Regulation). There are different ways of forming an SE (basically by merger,
direct incorporation, and transformation). The Regulation leaves open the possibility for
Member States to determine that public limited liability companies subject to their laws
may not take part in the formation of an SE by merger, on grounds of public interest. This
has been the position that Spain has adopted in Law 19/2005, through which opposition
may occur on the grounds of public interest. An SE with a registered office in Spain will
be governed by the Regulation, the provisions of the new chapter that has been added to
the Spanish Public Limited Liability Company Law, and the provisions of the law to be
adopted regulating the involvement of the employees in an SE with registered office in
Spain. The Regulation establishes that an SE may not be registered until the involvement
of the employees in an SE has been determined pursuant to Directive 2001/86/EC. There-
fore, the Spanish law to be adopted, which will incorporate the provisions of said Directive,
is of notable importance for the formation of an SE in Spain.
Finally, as a novelty for Spain, Law 19/2005 establishes that an SE with registered office
in Spain can adopt, as its management structure, either a one-tier system, which consists
of an administrative body, or a two-tier system, which includes a supervisory body and a
management body. With respect to the liability regime applicable to the members of the
administrative body, the supervisory body or the management body Law 19/2005 provides
that the provisions of the Spanish public limited liability company regarding liability of
73. See Federal Law No. 109-FZ, Rossiiskaia Gazeta [Ros. Gaz.] [Russian Newspaper] 2005, No. 161, p. 29.
74. The lower house of the Russian parliament had been scheduled to hold a first reading on November 2,
2005, but it was postponed because of a lack of clarity on how to restrict foreign involvement in mineral
resources that Russia considers strategic.
p. Contributed by Victor Xercavins, Partner, and Alessandra de Magalhaes Vaquero, Associate, of Cuatre-
casas, LLP.
75. Law 19/2005 of November 14th (B.O.E. 2005, 273) (Spain).
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directors will also apply to the members of the above mentioned bodies of an SE with
registered offices in Spain.
XVII. Swedenq
A. INTRODUCTION AND MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
As in much of the rest of Europe and the Americas, the twin hallmarks of the Swedish
M&A market during 2005 have been the strength of private equity and the overall im-
pression that this is a sellers' market. On the regulatory side, there have been important
developments in tax and a complete overhaul of the Swedish Companies Act,76 as well as
important rulings on hostile bids.
On the market side, private equity-as well as the ever-more-visible hedge funds-is
moving from strength to strength, with financial buyers still dominating the buy side and,
increasingly, exiting to other financial players in the secondary market. As elsewhere, there
is growing competition for viable targets still capable of generating expected returns. Par-
ticularly notable deals, in addition to the Old Mutual/Skandia struggle discussed below,
have included the sale by EQT of Swedish cable operator ComHem to Carlyle and Prov-
idence and the ten billion euro leveraged buy-out of Nordic telecom TDC by Apax, Black-
stone, KKR, Permira and Providence," as well as the private equity-led public offer for
Scandinavian property services concern ISS.
B. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
After over a decade of preparations and analysis, Sweden has finally passed an omnibus
revision to the Companies Act. Although a number of the provisions were already incor-
porated by earlier amendments, some are entirely new and some have been clarified. Among
the most important changes from an M&A perspective are the lifting of various restrictions
on the capital structure of Swedish corporations (aktiebolag) that opens the door for a variety
of new financing options (such as participating debentures and other hybrid instruments),
as well as the liberalization of the financial assistance restrictions to allow for more flexible
vendor financing and leverage opportunities.78
Another major development was an important revision of the Swedish tax code, intro-
ducing the participation exemption (relief from tax on capital gains and dividends in certain
group settings) into the Swedish tax environment. When combined with other aspects of
Swedish tax law, such as no thin capitalization rules, no withholding tax on interest, and a
broad tax treaty network, the new regime has prompted an increasing number of multi-
nationals to establish Swedish holding companies for their European and other operations
and to migrate debt to their Swedish holding structure. Finally, the protracted hostile bid
by Old Mutual for the Skandia insurance company has not only dominated the M&A
q. Contributed by Maria Tufvesson Shuck and Adam Green, Partners ofMannheimer Swartling, New York
office.
76. Svensk Forfattningssamling (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 2005:551) (Swed.) [hereinafter the Swed-
ish Companies Act].
77. Both reflecting the increasing incidence of club deals, and the latter the largest private equity deal since
KKR acquired RJR Nabisco back in 1989.
78. Swedish Companies Act, supra note 76.
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headlines during the second half of 2005, it has also resulted in a number of rulings on
important takeover issues, including board duties and takeover defences.
Overall, this has been a time of significant legislative change in Sweden. The impact will
most likely play out over the next few years as the market comes to understand and capitalize
on the new rules and recommendations.
XVIII. Switzerlandr
With respect to business activities, the number of mergers has increased in 2005 com-
pared to previous years. In addition, some major takeover battles took place during the
year. With regard to one merger, the Swiss Takeover Board ruled that agreements with
board members granting them long term contracts (i.e., golden parachutes) were not in the
interest of the company. Therefore, the agreements were to be qualified as a defense not
permitted by law 79 in that case.
In 2005, there were no significant changes to the Swiss merger and acquisition law. The
new merger act80 had come into force on June 1, 2004. Although no significant judgment
based on this act has been rendered yet, experience in applying the new act was gained
during the year in review. Therefore it is worthwhile to outline briefly its scope.
The main purpose of the new act is to regulate all restructuring of businesses in any new
form. As such, it governs mergers, demergers, conversions, and transfers of assets and lia-
bilities. Consequently, the new law regulates all types of mergers of all company forms,
associations, and foundations provided for in the Code of Obligations. Beyond the scope
of pure mergers, the act also allows for the conversion of a company into another legal
form and permits such company to continue to exist. The result of such conversion is a
change of the legal form but it does not provide for a transfer of assets. Regarding demer-
gers, the act distinguishes between spin-offs (formations of two or more companies while
the existing company continues to exist) and a division (dissolution of the existing company
and transfer of business to two or more other companies). Further, it is now possible to
transfer entire businesses or parts thereof based on the new act.
With respect to taxes, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court also ruled in 2004 that a trans-
action might qualify as an indirect partial liquidation or a transposition in the following
situation: if a seller holds shares as private assets and such shares are sold to a company or
person holding the shares as business assets, the price for these shares will be indirectly
financed by the target company, which will distribute profits, and the contracting parties
will cooperate regarding the removal of assets from the target. In such a situation, it is
highly recommended to obtain a ruling from the authorities. But in the aftermath of this
decision there has been wide criticism."' Presently, there is a draft for a regulation, not yet
enacted, that would lessen the decision's consequences.
r. Contributed by Florian S. J6rg, MCJ, Associate of Froriep Renggli, Zurich office.
79. Swiss Takeover Board, Empfehlung I-VIII, available at www.copa.ch/intro-en.html. This decision is in
German, involving Sumida Holding Germany GmbH and Saia-Burgess Electronics Holding AG.
80. Federal Act on Mergers, Demergers, Conversion and Transfer of Assets and Liabilites, No. 221.301
(Oct. 3, 2003).
81. Barbara B. Rohrer & Nicolas Scholl, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Zurich, Switzerland: Indirect Partial
Liquidation & Its Prospects, available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page = 17&ISS = 17446
&SID = 522657 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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XIX. United Kingdom s
Between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005, the United Kingdom assumed the Pres-
idency of the EU Council. The Government of the United Kingdom indicated that a key
theme for its 2005 Presidency would be the continued improvement to the European Com-
munity (EC) company law framework and the continued compliance with pre-existing EC
legislation. It is unsurprising therefore, that in 2005, the United Kingdom has witnessed
the implementation of numerous pieces of EC company law as well as proposals for reform
of national company law that will affect M&A that take place in the jurisdiction.
From July 1, 2005, the existing United Kingdom Listing Rules were replaced by a new
three-part block in the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Handbook comprising the List-
ing Rules, Prospectus Rules and Disclosure Rules. These new rules reflect: (1) implemen-
tation of the EU Market Abuse Directive; 2 (2) implementation of the EU Prospectus Di-
rective;83 and (3) the results of a detailed review of the existing listing regime conducted by
the FSA.
At the same time, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the FSMA 2000) has also
been amended by the FSMA 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 200584 and by the EU
Prospectus Regulations 5 that implement the EU Market Abuse Directive and the EU Pro-
spectus Directive and give the FSA the power to make the Disclosure Rules and Prospectus
Rules.
A. COMPANY LAw REFORM BILL
On November 3, 2005, the long-awaited Company Law Reform Bill86 was published.
Envisaged amendments to the United Kingdom's company law framework include, inter
alia, the introduction of a new statutory regime for shareholder litigation; the introduction
of a statutory statement of directors' duties; the introduction of auditor liability limitation
and amendments to shareholder communication and voting requirements. In addition,
there are various deregulatory measures for private companies, including the simplification
of the financial assistance rules; the abolition of the requirement for private companies to
hold annual general meetings and the need for a private company secretary. The timing for
the implementation of the bill is still not clear, but the Government of the United Kingdom
has indicated that it will not come into force before 2007.87
B. EU TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE TAKEOVER CODE
The EU Takeover Directive (the Directive) came into force on May 20, 2004, aiming to
impose minimum standards for the regulation of takeovers across Europe. Member States
are required to implement the Directive by May 20, 2006. From a United Kingdom per-
s. Contributed by Malcolm Lombers, Parmer, and Tom Platts, Associate, Herbert Smith LLP.
82. Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 OJ. (L 96) 16 (EC).
83. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 OJ. (L 345) 64 (EC).
84. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/73 (U.K.).
85. Prospectus Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1433 (U.K.).
86. Company Law Reform Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill 134] (U.K.).
87. See Deparuent of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform Bill, http://www.dti.gov.UK/cld/facts/
clr.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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spective, many of the key provisions of the Directive are similar to those in the City Code
on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code)"8 and the provisions of the Companies Act 1985 s9
relating to squeeze out and sell out rights. But its implementation will require some minor
changes to the current regulatory system in the United Kingdom. 9° The Takeover Panel,
for example, will be given statutory powers to impose and enforce the Code.91 The Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry is not proposing,
however, that the rules set out in the Code be contained in any primary legislation.
C. RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHAREs (THE SARs)
The Takeover Panel has proposed the abolition of the SARs. 92 The SARs were introduced
in 1980, following concerns about market raids on the shares of listed companies prior to
the launch of a bid. They limit the speed with which a person can acquire between 15
percent and 30 percent of the voting rights of a company so that all shareholders have the
opportunity to sell their shares to the potential acquirer and so that target boards can advise
their shareholders. The Takeover Panel pointed out that the SARs do not restrict share
dealings but instead focuses on the consequences that flow.from any such dealings. The
Takeover Panel does, however, propose retaining the rules on tender offers (currently in
SAR 4) as it believes that tender offers can be used to frustrate a Code offer. The Rules of
the London Stock Exchange on the conduct of tender offers only apply to companies listed
on the Official List.
XX. Venezuela'
During this past calendar year there has not been any noteworthy legal development
affecting M&A and joint ventures under Venezuelan jurisdiction other than the enactment
of the Currency Exchange Criminal Law that limits business transactions in foreign cur-
rency and may have an impact on some.
88. The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, available at http://
www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/codesars/DATA/code.pdf.
89. Companies Act, 1985, S.I. 1985/805.
90. Company Law Reform Bill at pt. 22, ch. 1, § 639.
91. Id. Such powers are outlined in the new Company Law Reform Bill.
92. See Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Consultation Paper Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel,
Proposed Abolition of the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares, PCP2005/4, Nov. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/consultation/DATA//PCP200504.pdf.
t. Contributed by Jorge Acedo Prato, Parmer of Hoet Pelaez Castillo & Duque.
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